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Abstract
We propose a quantum transmission based on bi-photons which are doubly-entangled
both in polarisation and phase. This scheme finds a natural application in quantum cryp-
tography, where we show that an eventual eavesdropper is bound to introduce a larger error
on the quantum communication than for a single entangled bi-photon communication, when
he steels the same information.
∗ genovese@ien.it
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The recent fast development of quantum states manipulation techniques has led to new
technological applications of quantum mechanics. Among different applications of quantum
mechanics to technology the possibility of transmitting absolutely confidential messages is
of the greatest interest. This is due to the possibility of creating a key for encoding and
decoding secret messages by transmitting single quanta between two parties (usually dubbed
Alice and Bob). The underlying principle of quantum key distribution (QKD) is that nature
prohibits gaining information on the state of a quantum system without disturbing it (in
particular no-cloning theorem guarantees that one cannot generates copies of an arbitrary
unknown state). Thus possible eavesdropping by a third party (usually dubbed Eve) can be
identified. This is at variance with current methods of public key cryptography, which are
based on the supposed, but unproven, classical computational difficulty in solving certain
problems, e.g. factoring large numbers in prime factors. Furthermore, a quantum computer
would efficiently solve these problems [1] breaking these kind of classical cryptographic
protocols. From this it arises the great interest in understanding and developing secure
quantum cryptographic schemes.
Since the original proposal of quantum cryptography [2], many different protocols for
this kind of transmission have been suggested [3–7].
For example, in Ekert’s protocol [5] entangled pairs are used. Both Alice and Bob receive
one particle of the entangled pair. Then they perform a measurement choosing among at
least three different selections. Alice and Bob communicate on a classical channel the bases
they have used: if measurements were performed in the same basis, they are perfectly
correlated and can be used for generating the secret key. The other measurements can be
used for a test of Bell inequalities. If a third party, Eve, tries to eavesdrop, she inevitably
affects the entanglement between the two particles leading to a reduction of the violation of
the Bell inequalities, which allows Alice and Bob to recognise the presence of the spy.
In the BB84 scheme [4] single states are transmitted from Alice to Bob, preparing them
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at random in four partly orthogonal states (for example, using photons, in polarisation
states at 0o and 90o, 45o and 135o). Bob selects the bases for the measurement at random
too. Then Alice and Bob communicate on a classical channel the bases they have used
(but not the results of course): when they have used the same basis Bob knows Alice’s
result and vice versa and they can build a key. If Eve tries to intercept the message, she
inevitably introduces errors, which Alice and Bob can detect by comparing a subsample
of the generated key using the classic channel (which in these schemes is supposed to be
subject to eavesdropping, but not alterable).
Many different experiments have been realised using the former schemes, demonstrating
the feasibility of QKD up to a distance of many kilometers [8] both in air and in fibre.
All of them are based on transmission of single photon states or weak coherent states,
where the alphabet is based either on photon polarisation or on photon phase. It must be
noticed that in the case of weak coherent states the transmission can, in principle, be unsafe
for sometimes the pulses necessarily contain more than one photon leaving the possibility
to an eavesdropper of using these events for gaining information about the key without
introducing any extra error [11]. The use of single photon sources closes this potential
security loophole.
General theorems have been demonstrated (mainly for BB84 protocol) which guarantees
the security of quantum cryptography in an ideal case [9,10], albeit no complete demon-
stration for every conceivable attack exists †. However, real experimental schemes suffer of
†It must be noticed that a completely general security demonstration could even be impossible in
presence of trojan horse attacks, i.e. when the eavesdropper can introduce some unwanted material
inside Bob lab using unused (for cryptographic transmission) degrees of freedom of the quantum
states. The demonstration of security against trojan horse attacks in ref. [10] does note really solve
the problem because it is based on teleportation, which requires the use of EPR pairs shared with
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huge losses and the application of these theorems is limited. Therefore, it is mandatory the
search for strategies which restrict the information potentially obtainable by eavesdropping
on real channels.
In this paper we propose the realisation of ”double entanglement” on a single photon pair
to be used for quantum communication. More in details, the bi-photon pair is entangled
both in polarisation and in phase, allowing a larger bit transmission for every pair and
making more difficult a successful eavesdropping.
The scheme for producing such an entanglement is relatively simple: for example it can
be realised placing on the pump beam a Mach-Zender interferometer (whose path length
difference is large compared to the pump pulse length) before the non-linear system where
a polarisation entangled pair is generated. The pump photon can thus follow the short or
the long path originating the superposition [13]:
|Ψp〉 = 1√
2
[
|s〉+ eiφ|l〉
]
(1)
where |s〉 and |l〉 denote the photon which has followed the short and the long path respec-
tively and φ the phase difference between the two paths.
Then the pump photon creates a photon pair entangled in polarisation by parametric
down conversion or in a type II crystal [12] either in two sequential type I crystals [14] (see
fig.1). The second solution presents some advantages for it does not have the problem of
different propagation of idler and signal inside the crystal due to different polarisation in a
birefringent medium [15], furthermore every Bell state can be easily obtained. Finally, using
two type I crystals and tuning the pump wave length, one can generate an entanglement
on two different frequencies: in this case one wave length could, for example, be chosen at
the maximum of transmission of an optical fibre or air and the other (the one remaining in
an insecure area where they can be subject to Eve’s manipulation.
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Alice’s laboratory) at the one maximising detection efficiency. Incidentally, it must also be
noticed that by using this scheme one could also easily obtain non-maximally entanglement
both in phase (using a not 50%−50% beam splitter) and polarisation (attenuating the pump
between the two crystals or/and using crystals of different lengths) [14]: this possibility has
relevance for experiments on foundations of quantum mechanics.
Using the two type I crystals scheme, the final bi-photon state is:
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[
|sH〉|sH〉+ |sV 〉|sV 〉+ eiφ(|lV 〉|lV 〉+ |lH〉|lH〉)
]
(2)
where H and V denote the horizontal and vertical polarisation respectively, whilst |s〉 and
|l〉 denote a photon created by a pump photon having travelled via the short or the long
arm of the interferometer.
This is the state that will be used for quantum transmission.
It must be noticed that this state is invariant in its form changing the polarisation or
the phase basis. For example if the basis
|±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉 ± |V 〉] (3)
is chosen, the state 2 can be rewritten as:
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[
|s+〉|s+〉+ |s−〉|s−〉+ eiφ(|l+〉|l+〉+ |l−〉|l−〉)
]
(4)
For implementing quantum communication, one photon is sent to Alice, the other to
Bob. Both select the photon by its polarisation (for example using a birefringent prism),
choosing different bases and then send it to a Mach-Zender interferometer, which introduces
exactly the same difference of travel times, within the coherence time of the down converted
photons, through the two arms as the interferometer on the pump (see [13]). Here they can
choose different phases for the long arm (see fig.2). The probability for detection in the
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central time slot ‡by a given combination of detectors depends on the phases (e.g. φ, τA, ψB)
of the three interferometers involved in production and detection of the photon pair [13] and
on the polarisers settings. Different choices originate different detection bases.
Therefore, this scheme allows to obtain two bits for each received photon, one related
to polarisation, the other to phase. When Alice and Bob have chosen the same two bases
(both for polarisation and phase) they have two correlated outputs, which they can use for
generating the key. The other choices can be used for testing the channel (e.g. by means of
Bell inequalities in the Ekert’s protocol).
In order to identify without error the state, Eve should hit both the bases. This proba-
bility is reduced to P 2 respect to P for a single entangled quantum channel.
In order to quantify this statement, let us begin considering the case where Alice and
Bob use the BB84 protocol (Eve produces the pair, keeps a photon which she will measure
in one of the two bases and send the other to Bob) and the final key is given by the sum
(modulo 2) of the two results obtained by Alice and Bob in the two bases when these have
been chosen in the same way. In this case the communication channel is a binary symmetric
one and the information on the channel is given by [16]
I = 1 + plog2p + (1− p)log2(1− p) (5)
where p is the probability for a correct transmission.
Let us begin considering the simplest case where Eve decides to eavesdrop the photons
directed to Bob in one of the possible basis used by Alice and Bob, both for the phase
and the polarisation ones. She has a probability q1 =
1
4
for mistaking the transmitted bit
‡corresponding to the two indistinguishable situations when the pump photon has followed the
short (long) arm of the interferometer and the two down converted photons both the long (short)
one (see [13]).
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on a single basis, leading to a probability of having a correct interception on the double
entangled system of p2 = 5/8, which gives, for Eq. 5, an information on the Alice-Eve
channel IAE = 0.046. Besides, Eve introduces a fraction of errors qAB = 15/32 on the Alice
- Bob channel, leading to an information on the Alice-Bob channel IAB = 0.0028.
If this eavesdropping scheme would have been applied to a single entangled channel, Eve
would have got a q1 error rate leading to IAE = 0.189 and would have produced a 3/8 error
rate on the Alice - Bob channel, corresponding to IAB = 0.046.
If Eve intercepts a fraction η of the transmitted photons, she obtains an information
IAE = 0.189η for the single entangled channel and IAE = 0.046η for the double entangled
one. In order to obtain the same information she will thus produce an error rate on the
Alice-Bob channel 7.7 larger for the double entangled channel, making by far easier her
identification in this case.
Let us then consider the case where Eve chooses for eavesdropping an intermediate basis
(dubbed the Breidbart basis) for both the phase and the polarisation ones respect to the
bases used by Alice and Bob. This choice does not introduce asymmetric errors, making
more difficult the identification of the eavesdropper. The probability for Eve to get a wrong
result for a single basis is q1 =
2−√2
4
, leading to a probability, for our scheme, of having
a correct interception of p2 = q
2
1
+ (1 − q1)2 = 1/4, which gives, for Eq. 5, IAE = 0.189.
Furthermore, Eve introduces a fraction of errors qAB = 3/8 on the Alice - Bob channel,
leading to IAB = 0.046.
On the other hand for the single entanglement, Eve has a q1 error rate leading to IAE =
0.399 and produces 1/4 of error rate on the Alice - Bob channel, with IAB = 0.189.
Eavesdropping a fraction η of the photons going to Bob, she obtains an information
IAE = 0.389η for the single entangled channel and IAE = 0.189η for the double entangled
one. In order to obtain the same information she shall thus produce an error rate on the
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Alice-Bob channel 19/6 larger for the double entangled channel, which, as before, results in
a much larger chance of identifying the eavesdropping in the double entangled case.
This result can also be obtained looking to the case where Alice and Bob adopt an error
correction procedure. If they eliminate all the errors and Eve has intercepted a fraction η of
photons, the upper limit on the information she could eavesdrop is [17] IAE = 0.299ηα for
the single entangled channel, whilst this is reduced to IAE = 0.118ηα for the double entan-
gled channel, where α is the reduction factor of the key length during the error correction
procedure. Therefore, this result shows once again that (even if an exhaustive discussion
of the value of α is missing [17]) the use of the double entangled channel allows a large
improvement of the transmission security.
As a further example, let us consider the effect on a simple implementation of Ekert’s
protocol, like the one realised in ref. [18]. In this case Alice and Bob measure their photons
each on two bases. One of the bases of Bob and Alice coincides and therefore, when both
use this basis, they obtain perfectly correlated results, which are used to build the key. The
other results are used for measuring the Wigner inequality:
W = p(χ, ψ) + p(ψ, ω)− p(χ, ω) ≥ 0 (6)
where p(χ, ψ) is the coincidence probability function for the measurement settings χ and
ψ of Alice and Bob respectively. This inequality is always satisfied for any local realistic
theory, but it is violated in quantum mechanics for an appropriate choice of settings. The
maximal violation is W = −1/8. If Eve intercepts a fraction of photons, she reduces
the violation of Eq. 6. In the implementation of ref. [18] the detection efficiency of each
photon path is 5% and the inequality 6 is measured with a 10% relative uncertainty. If Eve
eavesdrops the photons on the commune basis, she obtains a perfect information of the key
for the intercepted photons. However, a 10% relative uncertainty on the measurement of
the Wigner function requires that Eve must intercept a fraction of 6.7% or smaller of the
photons addressed to Bob for remaining undetected.
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If a double entangled channel is used, Eve would affect the value of two Wigner inequali-
ties at the same time, this requires that she reduces (for not being discovered) the intercepted
fraction to 4.7%, leading to a reduction of a factor 0.7 for the eavesdropped information in
comparison with the single entangled channel.
Finally, as a last example, let us consider the case where Eve decides to eavesdrop on
a generic basis given by a superposition of the basis states |sH〉, |lH〉, | sV 〉 and |lV 〉. She
chooses at random the basis for the measurement, using a generic SO(4) (SO(2) for the single
entanglement) transformation of the previous basis: in this way, on average, no asymmetric
error is introduced. After having performed the measurement, Eve passes the photon to
Bob exactly in the same state she found it in. In order to understand the effect of such a
procedure we have performed a Montecarlo simulation of the eavesdropping, evaluating the
errors on the Alice-Bob channel. Our numerical results shows that the errors on the Alice-
Bob channel are increased of a factor 1.25 about for the double entangled channel respect
to the single entangled one, leading to an easier detection of the eavesdropper in the double
entangled channel for this example as well.
A general discussion of security in presence of joint or coherent attacks is beyond the
purpose of this work, however, it is evident how the presence of a double entanglement makes
much more complicate the use of a translucent interception scheme as, for example, the one
described in ref. [19]. Thus one can expect that double entanglement should also be efficient
in increasing security against these kinds of eavesdropping.
In summary, we have shown that the use of states entangled on two (or eventually more)
quantum degrees of freedom at the same time allows a safer communication for realistic
quantum channels. We have also proposed a scheme for obtaining such a double entangle-
ment, which can be easily realised with a simple modification of present experiments.
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Figures Caption
1) Scheme for the generation of the double entangled photon pairs. A Mach-Zender
interferometer creates a state of the pump photon which is given by the superposition of
the states corresponding to the photon following the long and the short path respectively.
The pump photon then generates or a horizontally polarised pair in the first type I (NLC1)
crystal either (after having been rotated by a λ/2 wave plate) a vertically polarised one in
the second type I (NLC2) crystal. The parametric down conversions of the two crystals are
then superimposed using an optical condenser with a hole drilled in the centre for leaving
pass the pump undisturbed. The optical path of idler, signal and pump are arranged by
means of compensator elements (C) for not introducing any delay among these (see ref. [14]
for details). The superposition of the probability of generating a pair in the first or in the
second crystal originates the polarisation entanglement.
2) The scheme for the reception apparatus of Alice and Bob. A prism, properly rotated,
allows a polarisation selection. On each arm exiting the prism a Mach-Zender interferometer
is inserted with a phase shift on the long arm which is suitably arranged by the observer.
Photo-detectors are denoted by an ellipse.
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